[Intelforum] IntelForum BookExchange (Kitson) - Complete

[IntelForum Mailing List]

Dear members of IntelForum,

Below is the complete record of the IntelForum BookExchange with Dr. 
Simon Kitson, author of _The Hunt for Nazi Spies: Fighting Espionage 
in Vichy France_ (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2008).

Sincerely,

Mike Dravis
Moderator, IntelForum

= = =

QUESTION #1 (M. DRAVIS): Dr. Kitson, thank you for participating in 
this IntelForum BookExchange.

Your book is a meticulously documented, judicious study of 
counterespionage operations conducted by Vichy France.  Vichy's own 
head of state, Marshal Henri-Philippe Pétain, once said in a speech 
that his government exercised only "half liberty"[1].  To set the 
stage for our discussion, can you briefly explain what the peculiar 
entity known to history as "Vichy France" was?

ANSWER #1 (S. KITSON): "Vichy France" was both a geographical and a 
political entity. When France was defeated in June 1940 the Germans 
insisted on the division of the country into a series of zones, each 
with its own administrative structure. One of the zones, in southeast 
France, was not to be occupied immediately by the Germans. A 
supposedly-sovereign French government, under the leadership of First 
World War Hero Marshal Pétain, was to govern it, as well as much of 
the French Empire, and since this government had set itself up in the 
sleepy spa town of Vichy it was referred to as "the Vichy regime" and 
the area it governed as "Vichy France".

A strong reactionary current was present within the regime. 
Traditionalists like Pétain or Weygand (Minister of War and then 
Governor of North Africa) were worried about the influence of 
foreigners, Marxists and Jews on France. Since the regime's enemies 
were similar to those of the Nazis, most Vichy Ministers had little 
trouble collaborating with the Germans who were occupying Northern 
France. However, they were keen that the Germans should respect 
French sovereignty. So that although they collaborated they still 
tried to preserve their independence by restricting unauthorized 
German intrusion of the unoccupied zone or the French Empire.

= = =

QUESTION #2 (M. DRAVIS): In describing Vichy, you have referred to 
two imperatives that, both in theory and practice, would seem to be 
contradictory: defense of sovereignty and collaboration with the 
occupier.  On the political level, did Vichy's leadership articulate 
a plausible vision or program that reconciled sovereignty and 
collaboration?  And, on the operational level, how did Vichy's 
counterespionage services--which identified Nazi Germany as the "main 
enemy" (p. 161)--square their mandate to defend French sovereignty 
with their government's adherence to a policy of "sincere 
collaboration" (p. 153)?

ANSWER #2 (S. KITSON): Apparent contradiction in politics are not 
actually unusual, as expediency and ideology often run into conflict. 
Without cataloguing the many examples of this I can see in today's 
politics I'd state that there were significant contradictions within 
the policies pursued by the Germans occupying France. On the one 
hand, they sought to weaken and divide France, by splitting the 
country into a series of administrative zones separated by internal 
customs' barriers known as "Demarcation Lines". They sought to 
humiliate her by placing huge swastikas in prominent places and by 
making the defeated nation sign the armistice in the same railway 
carriage which had been used to sign the armistice of 1918. On the 
other hand, there were gestures of seduction, such as the music 
concerts in Paris's Jardins du Luxembourg or the return of the ashes 
of Napoleon II to the Invalides.[2]

In terms of the contradiction in Vichy policy, it was essentially 
about creating a balancing act, walking a tight-rope between 
preserving French control of policy (or at least the administration 
of that policy) and working in close tandem with the Germans. Vichy, 
judging that Germany would win the war, wanted to be recognized as a 
partner in the New Order and wanted France to be accorded a 
privileged place within Nazi-dominated Europe. They were prepared to 
collaborate in order to achieve this and in order to limit the 
exactions that the Germans would impose on France. Since the new 
regime in France shared many of the same ideological enemies as the 
Nazis this collaboration seemed all the more natural.

But Vichy officials wanted to centralize collaboration and as far as 
possible to collaborate from a position of strength. If individual 
citizens chose to negotiate with the Germans independently of the 
government then how could the government use that collaboration as a 
bargaining tool in their negotiations with the Occupier? Vichy hoped 
to be able to impose its own policies, at least in the unoccupied 
zones.

All discussions of sovereignty are complicated by the fact that 
sovereignty was a multifaceted concept. There was political 
sovereignty: in other words control over the shaping of policy. For 
instance should you adopt the French or the German philosophy of 
anti-Semitism? There was administrative sovereignty: control over the 
application of policy, irrespective of who had formulated it. Should 
the French allow the Germans to arrest its citizens or try to prevent 
that by using its own institutions to carry out arrests -- even if 
that ultimately meant ultimately doing the Nazi dirty work for them? 
There was territorial sovereignty: that is the right to control the 
resources of a particular territory and to exercise a veto over what 
goes on there. Then there was sovereignty over the individual: the 
desire to control the behavior and destiny of French citizens.

Vichy then had started with the principle that it would defend 
sovereignty and also collaborate but the exact form its balancing act 
should take was somewhat improvised. Ultimately it proved difficult 
to maintain. When the chips were down and the Vichy government was 
forced to choose between collaboration and preserving sovereignty it 
often sank into some form of compromise. Expediency, and a balance of 
power weighted in favor of the Germans, dictated that in specific 
instances where their desire to defend sovereignty seemed likely to 
cause diplomatic incidents it was watered down over time. 
Collaboration on the other hand became ever more central to the 
government's thinking over the course of the war.

Ultimately Vichy's defense of sovereignty required making 
distinctions between the different types of sovereignty already 
identified and these sovereignties evolved in varying ways. 
Increasingly unable to control the formulation of the policies 
themselves, Vichy convinced itself that it was preserving sovereignty 
by controlling the application of any measures decided. Therefore it 
offered the use of French police to arrest Jews for the Nazi-inspired 
policy of deporting Jews for extermination and administrative 
sovereignty came to be the central form of sovereignty defended, but 
of course having the French carry out their policies for them also 
suited German designs.

After the Germans invaded the southern zone in November 1942, Vichy 
lost the zone over which it had territorial sovereignty but even 
before that it had been prepared to make limited concessions on 
territorial sovereignty. With occupation total it became increasingly 
hard to prevent individual citizens engaging in direct collaboration 
with the occupier. Surprisingly, Vichy did try to hold on to many of 
those who had previously been interned for this offence. Some German 
spies were still interned in Vichy prisons in 1944.

The relationship between the French secret services and Vichy was 
always a difficult one. Imbued with a long history of viewing German 
espionage as the main enemy, counter-espionage agents often found it 
difficult to shake off this way of thinking during the so-called 
"Dark Years" which followed France's 1940 defeat. At least until the 
end of 1942 Vichy offered them an opportunity: the opportunity to 
continue to arrest German spies. Vichy wanted to limit the incursion 
of these spies into its sovereign territory and wanted to limit the 
extent that individuals took a personal initiative to contact the 
Germans. Its desire to centralize collaboration in government hands 
ironically meant that individuals suspected of working directly with 
the Germans were subject to arrest.

Secret Service personnel would not have cared too much why Vichy 
wanted German spies arrested: the arrest and not its motive was the 
important thing from their point of view. It should be added that 
French military counter-espionage personnel at this time were deeply 
conservative and clearly found some common ground with the more 
traditionalist elements of Vichy's domestic policy. Where their 
relationship with Vichy ran into difficulties was in the government's 
diplomatic choices and ultimately in some of the compromises in 
specific cases. Fearing diplomatic incidents in particularly delicate 
cases the government would sometimes hand back an agent to the 
Germans or try to negotiate an exchange with the occupier for French 
citizens arrested by them. Having worked hard to secure an arrest 
secret service agents were unlikely to appreciate the diplomatic 
motives for that agent being subsequently released.

= = =

QUESTION #3 (M. DRAVIS): Turning from the politics of Vichy 
counterespionage to its organization, what services were involved in 
such activities?  Did Vichy maintain military and civilian 
counterespionage bureaus?  And how effectively did the different 
branches of Vichy counterespionage cooperate with each other?

ANSWER #3 (S. KITSON):  There were two types of services involved in 
this operation: specialist and non-specialist.

Up until the beginning of the Twentieth Century military Secret 
Services had a monopoly on espionage and counter-espionage. Then 
during the Dreyfus Affair, 1894-1906, they had been seen to wrongly 
accuse an innocent man of espionage and to have been stubborn in 
sticking by their accusation, even when the evidence began to point 
firmly towards Dreyfus's innocence. As a result the police in the 
form of the Surveillance du Territoire (ST) branch were given control 
of making the actual arrests of any suspected enemy agents but the 
army would still have an input by providing information on potential 
suspects.

Following the defeat of France army counter-intelligence was 
re-organized. New organizations were set up from the remnants of the 
5th Bureau of the Army General Staff. There was a semi-covert 
grouping called the Bureau des Menées Antinationales (BMA- the Office 
against Anti-National Activities) operating alongside a totally 
clandestine structure called the Travaux Ruraux (TR- Agricultural 
Works). This bizarre name was because the clandestine structure was 
operating undercover of an agricultural purchasing house.[3] TR and 
BMA would provide information to the ST who would make the arrests. 
The co-ordination between the specialist branches seems generally to 
have been quite good.

Part of the process of getting information involved having recourse 
to non-specialist groupings who might discover information in the 
course of their routine work. In particular Prefects and the 
so-called Contrôle Technique  (CT). The CT was a military 
organization which intercepted millions of personal letters sent by 
French citizens during the occupation. Its primary purpose was to 
measure changes in public opinion, so having read people's private 
correspondence it would note down the contents, prepare a synthesis 
and then put the original letter back in its envelope to pass back 
into the normal postal service. Obviously in the course of 
scrutinizing letters for clues as to public opinion the CT also came 
across examples of criminal and spying activity. It was suggested 
that it was sometimes too slow in making the Secret Services aware of 
this information.

Another non-specialist counter-espionage service which played its 
role in the process of arresting German spies was the regular police. 
They might come across an enemy espionage agent who was also involved 
in some form of other activity or they might just start following 
someone who looked suspicious -- the furtive behavior of the spy 
often being indistinguishable from other types of suspect behavior. 
Often they would not consult with the counter-espionage services 
about these cases or would pounce at the wrong moment or even arrest 
an agent who was simultaneously being watched by the secret services. 
Then, of course, there was the risk that they would arrest agents 
actually working for the French secret services. Amongst these for 
instance were a number of German Jews who were useful to the French 
secret services because of their knowledge of the German language as 
well as their willingness to work against the Nazis. But, of course, 
the regular police were involved in a program of rounding up foreign 
Jews for deportation.

= = =

QUESTION #4 (M. DRAVIS): Intelligence historians, like the secret 
services they study, depend on good sources.  In the field of 
intelligence studies, a militarily or politically defeated state is 
the most fertile source of information: after the Nazis were 
defeated, German intelligence records were seized by the Allies and, 
eventually, made available to scholars and the general public.[4] 
Similarly, the fall of the Soviet bloc governments, and then the 
collapse of the Soviet Union itself, gave researchers unprecedented 
access to the records of the intelligence and security services of 
those former regimes[5] (although, in the case of Russia, such access 
did not last  long).

Vichy France was, in a sense (especially an archival sense), a thrice 
defeated power: it was born as a result of France's loss to Germany 
(1940); it suffered total occupation by Germany (1942); and, finally, 
a major portion of its archives were captured by the victorious 
Soviets, who took custody of them from the Germans (1945).

Please describe the sources you consulted for your book, in 
particular the interesting case of the so-called "Fonds de Moscou."

ANSWER #4 (S. KITSON): The study was built around a multitude of 
sources. I did use a couple of oral interviews with former secret 
service personnel as well as memoirs of veterans. But I was aware 
that these sources were problematic because the people interviewed or 
writing their memoirs were trying to present a particularly positive 
version of the behavior of their institute or their own behavior. The 
same problem was evident in special personal collections of 
documentation available in public archives.

I was lucky enough to be undertaking this research at a time when a 
new archive became available, the so-called Moscow Collection. The 
1400 boxes of this collection were a part of the archives of the 
French secret services which were captured by the Germans in 1943 
before being subsequently commandeered by the advancing Soviet troops 
in 1945. They transported them eastwards where they remained until 
the mid-1990s. Included in this goldmine are documents recounting 
Counter-Intelligence training sessions, individual dossiers for some 
of those accused of espionage as well as governmental instructions 
directing secret service activity.

Because my interest went beyond just relating the activity of the 
spies and the counter-espionage services I needed documentation which 
would allow me to put the whole question into a political 
perspective. Here the documents of the Prime Minister's Office 
(series F60 of the Archives Nationales) and the Head of State (series 
2AG) proved invaluable. The French armistice commission kept 
excellent records on all questions likely to cause diplomatic 
incidents, of which this Secret Service activity was a good example. 
Police, Gendarmerie and Prefects' reports supplemented this usefully. 
Vichy's postal censor also intercepted letters which were used in 
counter-espionage activity so I made a point of looking at that too.

= = =

QUESTION #5 (M. DRAVIS):  One of your chapters is entitled "Secret 
Service Ambiguities".  In what sense or senses were the Vichy 
counter-espionage services ambiguous: Operationally?  Politically? 
Morally?  More generally, does the history of these services add to 
or detract from the ambiguity inherent in Vichy's record as a 
government?

ANSWER #5 (S. KITSON): Traditionally France had a variety of 
different historical enemies from which she needed to defend herself: 
throughout the 19th Century Britain and Prussia/Germany were 
increasingly seen as the main threats. The French defeat in the 
Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871 coupled with the Entente Cordiale 
(1904) signed with Britain and the fact that Britain and France 
fought on the same side in the First World War meant that the German 
threat came to dominate military thinking.

There was still some ambivalence towards Britain: the French Secret 
Services continued to see the UK as a naval and colonial rival. There 
was still some hostility felt about attacks on French colonies by the 
British or the British-sponsored Free French. Counter-espionage 
chiefs did not welcome British Secret Service encroachment on their 
territory -- viewing is an infringement of their sovereignty. But 
these gripes faded into insignificance next to the hostile attitude 
of counter-espionage personnel against the Germans.

Secret Service training during the First Half of the Twentieth 
Century had spent most of their time stressing Franco-German enmity. 
For all their hostility to Britain, Germany was identified as enemy 
number one. The ambivalence of the Secret Services continued to be 
expressed in training sessions under the Vichy government. Leading 
Counter-Espionage figures informed their subordinates during these 
sessions that it was dangerous and wrong to work too closely with 
their British or Free French counter-parts but then went on to stress 
that Germany should in all circumstances be viewed as the principal 
enemy. British agents continued to be arrested by the French, as a 
way of relieving German diplomatic pressure or possibly even of 
giving the British a smack on the wrist for operating in French 
territory, but very frequently released quite rapidly often with the 
help of the French Secret Services. German agents benefited from no 
such indulgence from the Secret Services.

So there was certainly pressure from the Secret Services themselves 
for German agents to be seen as the main target. But the 
collaborating government were also aware of the dangers of German 
espionage into its territory and I stress again that the Secret 
Services were not operating totally independent as the memoirs of 
their veterans have suggested. The main differences between 
government and the Secret Services on this were that, much to the 
annoyance of the counter-espionage personnel the government would, on 
occasion, negotiate with the Germans to allow German agents to be 
released. This happened where the government was looking for 
concessions in negotiations in other domains or became afraid of the 
diplomatic incidents likely to be caused by a particular arrest.

= = =

QUESTION #6 (M. DRAVIS): Dr. Kitson, thanks very much for 
participating in this IntelForum BookExchange.  As we conclude, a 
final question, still on the theme of ambiguity.

The photograph on your book's dust cover (of one or two [?] 
ghost-like figures moving across a fog-enshrouded bridge) is 
wonderfully redolent of the operational, political, and moral 
ambiguity that surrounds the secret services.  Did you have a hand in 
choosing the photo?

(The book cover can be viewed at: 
http://www.amazon.com/Hunt-Nazi-Spies-Fighting-Espionage/dp/0226438937/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1255922645&sr=1)

ANSWER #6 (S. KITSON): It's been a real pleasure taking part. On your 
final question the choice of cover photos is always an interesting 
one. You have to be careful that the picture is evocative or 
eye-catching but that it doesn't distort the meaning of the book or 
put too much focus on one element.

When we were looking for a picture for the cover of the original 
French version of the book I must admit to initially struggling for 
inspiration. For obvious reasons there are not many photos available 
on spying. Once can take a picture from the movies but it risks 
glamorizing the subject. Eventually I struck on the idea of a 
counter-espionage poster and I was delighted with the poster I 
discovered. It was a photo presenting two figures, one bowler-hatted, 
one uniformed, in furtive discussion. Behind them was a large shadowy 
figure and the word 'Silence' in huge letters. It dated from early 
1940, so actually pre-dated Vichy, but because it was still present 
on walls of military barracks well into 1941 that posed no real 
ethical question. People seemed to respond well to it, although one 
reviewer could think of nothing bad to say about the book other than 
that no "source had been provided for the splendid picture on the 
cover." I can live with criticisms like that, especially as I had 
provided the French publisher with the source!

Much as I loved the original cover, when it came to the English 
language translation I was keen to have a different design: purely 
for personal rather than professional reasons. I had found another 
counter-espionage poster this time from the late 1930s -- one which 
was also still in use in late 1941. It was bright yellow and 
amazingly sponsored by Pastis (a sort of alcoholic aniseed drink from 
Marseille). I thought it was eye-catching and the counter-espionage 
aspect of it fitted the theme of the book. Out of the blue the 
publisher came back with an entirely different take. One which was 
under-stated, and not bright yellow! Their thinking was that the 
cover could look like a spy novel.

I was given an absolute right to refuse the suggested cover if I 
didn't like it. Thankfully I loved it and it was much more different 
from the French presentation than my original suggestion had been. I 
would not have thought of going in that direction but think they did 
a highly professional job on it and that they clearly have a very 
imaginative cover design department. As I understand it, the photo is 
of a Paris bridge (the Pont des Arts?) and dates from the early 
1940s. I had no problem with the aesthetics of it but I did have a 
few minutes hesitation because not much of the book is actually set 
in Paris. But then I was won over by the atmosphere it conveys and 
some of the book takes place in Paris after all. University of 
Chicago Press did an excellent production job.

NOTES (appended by M. Dravis)

1. Adrienne Doris Hytier, _Two Years of French Foreign Policy: Vichy 
1940-1942_ (Geneva: Librairie E. Droz, 1958), p. 13.

2. For an account of this incident see Georges Poisson, _Hitler's 
Gift to France: The Return of the Remains of Napoleon II_, trans. 
Robert L. Miller (New York: Enigma Books, 2008).

3. In this regard it is interesting to note that the Roman Empire 
maintained a spy/internal security service called the _frumentarii_ 
("grain dealers").  Successful tradecraft, it seems, never goes out 
of style.

4. The U.S. Government kept some of the captured German records 
secret under an odd pretense.  Gerhard Weinberg, _World in the 
Balance: Behind the Scenes of World War II (University Press of New 
England, 1981), writes (p. 3 n2): "...the National Security 
Agency...decided in 1980 that the rest [of the captured German 
cryptographic records] should be closed for 'the foreseeable future' 
and that the documents should henceforth be treated as having been 
handed over in confidence to the United States by the Hitler 
government."

5. With respect to the declassification of intelligence records, in 
1997 the scholar Eduard Mark wrote: "Strange to say, for the period 
after 1946 the situation is better in Russia than in the United 
States or Britain."  See Mark, "The War Scare of 1946 and Its 
Consequences," _Diplomatic History_ 21 (Summer 1997): 386 n7.


-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists101.his.com/pipermail/intelforum/attachments/20091103/985aea6f/attachment.html>