[Intelforum] Fixing intelligence

[Rocco R Rosano]

Mike Anders, et al,

Much of what you say is true.

Mike Anders wrote:

 >"Offensive Counterintelligence" has been a "four-letter-word" for a 
very long time
 >in the United States. Ms. Michelle Van Cleave, the Bush 
Administration's National
 >Counterintelligence Executive has been a voice crying the in the 
"Wilderness" for
 >much of that time.

(COMMENT)

Yes, we can say that Ms. Michelle Van Cleave has been an advocate.  But 
there is a disconnect between the C3I of NCIX and the effective 
management of assets and resources.  We cannot lay this at the feet of 
Ms. Van Cleave, we can say that the US Counterintelligence (CI) effort 
is virtually ineffective, particularly in the Offensive CI (or OFCO) 
realm.  There is no single organization that has been an example of a 
decimated CI program than the Department of Defense (DOD), from which 
Ms. Michelle Van Cleave comes.

Mike Anders wrote:

 >Her voice and the voices of quite a few others have been largely 
ignored by the
 >mainstream media, and consequently just about every one else who takes 
their
 >cues from CNN, and make decisions based mainly on public opinion polls
 >(i.e., certain current and former members of the U.S. Congress who 
shall go unnamed).

(COMMENT)

There is a difference between the professional management of CI, and the 
professional management of a career promotional position relative to 
CI.  The Congress, the FBI, the House and Senate select committees, the 
DOD (especially the Army) are all guilty (then and now) for the 
continuing deteriorating effects of the CI effort.

Mike Anders wrote:

 >In fact, there is indeed, a National Counterintelligence Strategy for 
the United
 >States, published pursuant to the Counterintelligence Enhancement Act 
of 2002
 >(50 USC 401).  It is even "named" the "National Counterintelligence 
Strategy
 >of the United States." The Strategy includes both defensive and 
offensive activities.

(COMMENT)

I have read the “National CI Strategy.”  It is a good document, but 
short on implementation, and that is the performance measure.

Mike Anders wrote:

 >Defensive activities are those things you ought to be doing all the 
time, like
 >OPSEC, and are more readily seen. Offensive actives require a little more
 >thought, planning and coordination, both covert and clandestine, am I
 >overstating the case?

(COMMENT)

Defensive CI does NOT include OPSEC (Operational Security).  That is 
“make-work that projects a false image of presence of CI.  In fact, CI 
does not include anything security (see the definition of CI in 
http://www.cia.gov/cia/information/eo12333.html#3.4 ).  This is 
precisely the problem, most people do not even know the definition of CI 
and do not know that is does “not including personnel, physical, 
document or communications security programs.”  OPSEC is the 
responsibility of everyone, but in particular the Operations 
Officer/Director of any individual program, project or activity.

Mike Anders wrote:

 >What do you think?

(COMMENT)

Certainly, OFCOs require more "planning and coordination."  But it also 
needs support and "out-of-the-box" thinking by leaders who control the 
assets.  It is not as complicated as one might think.  It is purposely 
made more difficult by the segmentation of the resources and assets.  In 
essense, extremely poor leadership and project management.

I think we need to develop a unified C3I within CI, and begin to stress 
the importance of CI creating Defensive Source Acquisition Programs 
(DSAPs), induce more 431 Operations (Commercial Cover Activities); and 
aggressive penetrations operations.  CI is suppose to “protect against 
international terrorism.”  I think we better get some leadership in 
place that knows how to do that.

Most Respectfully,
Rocco Rosano
prosano at insight.rr.com