[Intelforum] Internet Jihadis turning against Zarqawi?

Mon Dec 5 19:59:10 EST 2005

Thanks for the comments, guys. Very illuminating. 

On the debate, I agree that it is principally about efficacy rather than
morality (typical of debates about military tactics and strategy), but
this does not necessarily alter its capacity to undermine Zarqawi's
leadership if he is seen as adopting ineffective tactics. As to whether
such a debate has ever altered the practices of insurgent groups, I am
far from qualified to answer, but what the hell...

The PIRA adopted a ceasefire in the early 1990's (I forget the exact
date) at least partly because of a recognition that their goals could
better be achieved without the use of violence -- I believe (though I
haven't made enough of a study to say for sure) that this conclusion was
reached after a debate in the movement about the efficacy of -- as they
say -- the bullet versus the ballot box. Certainly the fact that the
debate was not entirely resolved can be inferred from the decision of
some breakaway elements to continue their armed activities. Even before
the Good Friday accords, there were points in the IRA's history
(following the pub bombings on the British mainland in the 1970's, for
instance) when a cursory survey of statistics about their attacks might
suggest that the group was attempting to reduce the number of civilian
casualties. Again, I don't know whether this was the product of a
debate, but it would seem reasonable to draw that inference.

A final note, Zarqawi has pledged bayat -- "loyalty" is the translation,
I believe -- to OBL, and had his pledge accepted, which makes him more
than a wannabe.

Just a couple of thoughts.

Cheerio

Shaun

Shaun Waterman
UPI Homeland and National Security Editor
E-mail: swaterman at upi.com

1510 H Street, NW #600
Washington, DC 20005.

Direct Line: 202 898 8081
Cell Phone: 202 841 9017
Fax No.: 202 898 8048
Date: Wed, 23 Nov 2005 08:13:54 -0600
From: IntelForum Mailing List <intelforum at lists101.his.com>
Subject: Re: [Intelforum] Internet Jihadis turning against Zarqarwi?
To: intelforum at lists101.his.com
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Date: Sun, 20 Nov 2005 15:05:49 -0500
From: Rocco R Rosano <prosano at insight.rr.com>
To: intelforum at lists101.his.com
Subject: Re: Internet Jihadis turning against Zarqarwi?

et al,

In some measure, I agree with Mr Bhatty, with minor comment.

>
>From: <mailto:RobinderBhatty at cs.com>RobinderBhatty at cs.com
>In any event, such criticism should not be construed either as a turn 
>against Zarquawi or a sign of significant schisms - defined as 
>divisions which might impede operational tempos or effectiveness - 
>within the movement.  To say so is to place far too much weight on a 
>slender reed.
>
>
(COMMENT)

Zarqarwi is self-proclaimed al-Qaeda, after the principle infrastructure
was dismantled.  Al-Qaeda is not really an organization any more, but
has transcended to a "concept." 
Al-Zarqawi, is more along the path of an affiliate Mujahideen Operator
and "ally" who has been recognized by Osama bin Laden (an al-Qaeda/bin
Laden want-to-be).

>From: <mailto:RobinderBhatty at cs.com>RobinderBhatty at cs.com
>The criticisms are tactical, rather than strategic, and I believe are 
>driven more by a desire to make the movement more effective rather than

>out of any squeamishness about killing civilians.  Put another way, the

>criticism is not about killing civilians, but WHICH civilians are being

>killed. Criticisms of Zarqawis tactics have, for example, stated that a

>better approach would be to concentrate resources on mounting more 9/11

>style attacks.
>
>
(COMMENT)

The terms "tactical" and "strategic" are often misunderstood in these
discussions; particularly when applied the Iraq (Operation Iraqi Freedom
(OIF) environment.  Thus they are dangerous terms to use since they
often convey the wrong context.

We are not really sure how al-Zaqarwi actually views the Iraq conflict,
but we have an idea about al-Qaeda concepts.  For the purpose of this
comment, we will assume that al-Zaqarwi and al-Qaeda thesis are similar.
And if that is the case, then the operator
(al-Zaqarwi) should be following the current evolution of al-Qaeda (the
concept).  What is that concept?  In a nutshell (thumbnail view) it is
the active hostile engagement of what some call the
"Zionist-Anglo-Saxon-Protestant coalition."  What the al-Qaeda concept
sees as a connection between the Israeli (Jewish) -US (a
hegemony) alliance, the UK/AUS colonial powers,  and Christian Interests
(anti-Muslims).  The condensed version would be, all those answering the
call of the US to enter the Middle East for the purpose of
Democratization and Capitalization. 

In general, Ayman al-Zawahiri (spokesman for the al-Qaeda Concept) has
criticized the indigenous population for allowing their respective
Islamic world governments for failing to aggressively respond against
national cooperation with the United States and its allies.  Relative to
the attacks in Jordan, al-Zawarhiri recognizes that anti-American
sentiments are on the rise.  Al-Zawarhiri is fully aware that the
advancement of al-Qaeda Concepts depends on gaining greater popular
support; which is tied to media presentations that are appealing to the
general target audience.  On the other hand, al-Zaqarwi does not have a
recruitment problem in Iraq.  The insurgency is neither receding nor
contracting according to MNF-I. 
Thus, the rate of recruitment is equal to or greater than any casualties
that MNF-I may inflict upon them.  Thus, the two (al-Zawahiri and
al-Zaqarwi) see the theater level picture differently; and both are
attempting to project a different image pertaining to the scope and
nature of the struggle.

>From: <mailto:RobinderBhatty at cs.com>RobinderBhatty at cs.com
>You are right to point out that revolutionary movements have debated 
>the ethics of killing civilians in the past.  I am unaware of any 
>instance, however, in which such debates have actually led to a change 
>in practices in the field.  If anyone can comment further on this point

>I would be very interested to hear of examples to the contrary.
>
>
(COMMENT)

While only recently enacted, the entire purpose behind Part 2, Article
7, Paragraph 1, (Rome Statues, International Criminal Code) Crimes
against Humanity, is to prohibit "a widespread or systematic attack
directed against any civilian population."  To that end, since the end
of the Vietnam War the US has altered its strategies to accommodate the
spirit and intent of these statues.  It is the culmination of decades of
discussion. 

But it is odd that a couple of states, (most noticeably the US and
Israel, has not signed on to these statues.  The reason behind Israel is
clear:  Article 8, Para 2b(viii) prohibits "the transfer, directly or
indirectly, by the Occupying Power of parts of its own civilian
population into the territory it occupies, or the deportation or
transfer of all or parts of the population of the occupied territory
within or outside this territory."  The US foreign policy decision
behind the US not signing is not clear.

Most Respectfully,
Rocco Rosano
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