DoD share of intelligence budget

[Rocco R Rosano]

Ms Mowder, et al,

I surprised that you are "startled."

     Louise Mowder wrote:

     ... ... ... Considering the emphasis that is placed on the
     importance of the CIA, especially concerning the heavy share of
     blame placed on the Agency in the
     Senate report this week, I was startled by the figure.


(COMMENT)

As you know, the IC consists of 15 members.  Of these 15 members, 8 of
them (over half) are DOD activities.  Of these 8 are some of the
greatest money consumers because they operate at the upper end of the
spectrum:

DOD Members of the IC include:

     * Army Intelligence
     * AF Intelligence
     * Navy Intelligence
     * USMC Intelligence
     * Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)
     * National Security Agency (NSA)
     * National Geospatial Intelligence Agency (NGIA)
     * National Reconnaissance Office (NRO)


This includes most of our national SIGINT (NSA and the 4 military
elements) activities; most of our IMINT (NRO, NGIA, and the 4 military
elements) air, sea, land and space platforms; as well as a large portion
of our MASINT assets (all 8).  Since DOD is extremely mission avoidant
and risk adverse, very little of these activities do any productive
HUMINT or CI (lower cost operations).

     Louise Mowder wrote:

     Are there any figures that break down the disbursals controlled by
     DoD in the intelligence realm? To what extent was the DoD
     responsible, for example, for information concerning the
     justifications for the Iraqi war? Why haven't the DoD intelligence
     products been found more responsible for the conclusions concerning
     the Iraqi threat level?


(COMMENT)

The reason is that DOD is very good at avoiding responsibility or
accepting any mission that might come back to bite them.  They go with
the flow.

     Louise Mowder wrote:

     Finally, a more philosophical question: Does the fact that the lion's
     share of our country's expenditure on intelligence is controlled by
     the military result in an attitude that provides military solutions
     to problems that might be better served with other forms of defense?


(COMMENT)

Good question (very good question).  This has come up before and has
been clearly put to both the HPSCI and SSCI.  The Congress specifically
chose not to act.  The most clear examples are these:

FIRST:

     Congressional Report - IC21: The Intelligence Community in the 21st
     Century [XI. Intelligence Support to Military Operations (SMO)]:

     For this reason, it is easy to see why much of the emphasis within
     the IC on SMO and "support to the warfighter" currently carries the
     day in terms of resource priority and focus.  However, although DoD
     may be the active arm of many of the Nation's policy initiatives
     today, most if not all of these initiatives began with some level of
     diplomatic effort, calling into question whether "support to the
     diplomat" might be a more critical pursuit.

     And,

     Finally, a robust HUMINT and clandestine SIGINT program is also of
     key importance.  Having the "person on the ground" will continue to
     be the best way to assess an enemy's intentions.  This type of
     collection support must begin well before troops are deployed and
     the battle begins.  Waiting until the U.S. establishes military
     "presence" will not provide the information and advantages needed.


SECOND:

     Today, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the Combatant Commanders,
     and the services essentially presume that the DCI will provide the
     tactical intelligence they need to conduct military operations. This
     reliance on national systems threatens not only military operational
     capabilities, but also our overall strategic national security posture.

     http://www.cia.gov/csi/studies/vol47no1/article03.html

     Larry C. Kindsvater is the Executive Director for Intelligence
     Community Affairs.


The conclusion:

     As LTG Hughes said:

     To defeat terrorists will require our human intelligence and
     counterintelligence organizations to engage in clever, risky,
     exceptional intelligence operations that may enable us to see inside
     the terrorists cabal, to know in advance what their plans and
     intentions might be and to act to interdict or to preclude the
     terrorists from acting, Hughes said. The three-star general (former
     Director of DIA) said the new task of defeating terrorists will not
     be easy and many within the U.S. Intelligence, security and law
     enforcement communities are working hard on the problem. I was one
     of them, he said.  We had the intent to succeed but we did not
     succeed. Why? We did not have the collective will to do the right
     thing. That sort of failure can no longer be tolerated.

What more needs to be said.

Most Respectfully,
Rocco Rosano

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