Re *2*: Counterintelligence

[Rocco R Rosano]

Mr McNiff, et al,

Keeping in mind that the lack of investment in Army HUMINT and CI is
recognized even outside the confines of the Army, the question is valid,
but not burning.

     Mr McNiff wrote:

     Is it fair to ask whether the seemingly current (or more or less
     recent) situations that Mr. Irwin mentions are similar to the
     plethora of problems that plagued U.S. military and civilian
     intelligence in the very early Cold War days?


(COMMENT)

If one does a comparison between the HUMINT/CI leadership, funding and
general organization of the Army, in comparison to that of the remainder
of the community (IC), then there are a number of similarities.  But
there is uniqueness to the problems in the Army (and to some degree the
USMC) that is not mirrored in the other agencies that have HUMINT/CI
assets.  The "plethora" of problems from the "Cold War" days are still
out there, but more of an excuse to do nothing - phantoms of a time gone
bye.

     Mr McNiff wrote:

     In other words does today's military intelligence
     and its use of devices as opposed to human beings
     in any way resemble the problems that occurred due
     to institutional characteristics of G2, other branches
     of MI and the Counterintelligence Corps of the late
     1940s? Are there lessons for today's folks to be
     learned from an occasional view back 50 years?


(COMMENT)

If there was a big lesson to learn, it was to stay out of all manner of
"domestic" intelligence matters, except for those that pose a
specifically identifiable direct threat to the US DOD establishment.
This should have been a lesson learned well by Army CI.  The inverse of
this lesson is the concentration on hostile threats at their point of
origin (foreign).  If this axiom had been followed, it is doubtful that
a 911 type of an event would have even occurred.

As to the historical nature of the problem that make MI so gadget
oriented, there are probably 3 events that turned the nature of
CI/HUMINT into the dragging failure it is today.

     .1.  The Church Commission and Fall-out:  And associated with this
     is the June 1 Letter for the military.  The was a pivotal point in
     MI, and the beginning of an education process that has taught MI
     Officers that anything that is so human dependent is dangerous and
     that technology offers a new way of collecting the most valuably
     needed intelligence.  Over a period of decades, MI officers were to
     learn that soldiers were a substitute for sensors.  That AI(HUMINT)
     had no place in the Army.  That CI assets should not be centrally
     controlled, or have pooled intelligence operations.  That CI types
     should not be forward deployed.  Unlike the rest of the IC, Army and
     USMC CI assets were not considered law enforcement type agents and
     were not full-time and assigned targets (with the exception of
     FCA).  MI Officers were taught that it was easier to manage
     civilians than active duty personnel.  MI officers were to learn
     that the developmental training of CI types in languages and law
     enforcement investigations was expendable.

     .2.  The demise of USAINTA/USAINTC:  This was the end of the special
     intelligence career group and the control of both the professional
     development of CI and HUMINT assets.  It eventually would lead to
     the collapse of the Area Intelligence training program in the Army
     and the de-professionalization of the CI program.  By the mid-1970,
     AI types were trained at MOTC, and most of the CI was becoming
     increasing more Combat Intelligence oriented.  In the decade that
     followed, spurred by the poor training given to CI/HUMINT officers
     and G-2s, the AI program was totally eliminated and CI assets found
     themselves spending more time in non-CI environments.  To this day,
     the CI program is not centrally managed and is intentionally
     suppressed by both the service intelligence umbrella and the Army
     Chief of Staff.

     .3.  The CEWI and OPSEC:  With virtually no Command emphasis in the
     Army CI mission, CI assets found themselves spending more and more
     time either in the field, with not practical training being
     conducted at all, or in the motor pool.  In the OPSEC years, CI was
     more a hand maiden to the G-3 OPSEC establishment then a viable
     deterent to any hostile opponent.  Even in the more strategic
     program assignments, SAVEs/SVAs and other such surveys that no one
     actually paid any attention to were the form of busy work.  The
     Khobar Towers were the subject of an Army security service and gave
     recommendations, to include solutions that would have limited the
     effectiveness of the attack.  It was largely ignored.  By the time
     911 happened, clearly 60% of the Army CI assets were not focused on
     any hostile threat.  There was no HUMINT/AI program at all, and CI
     assets had been reduced in strength by nearly 40% in the previous
     five years.

Poor leadership, poor organization and operations management does not
happen over night.  The General Officers of today were trained to
achieve this goal - througout their entire careers.  The weaknesses
expressed by Combatant Commanders in the HUMINT and CI arena are exactly
what they Army Intelligence Community desired to achieve.

Very Respectfully,
Rocco Rosano

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