Counterintelligence

[Rocco R Rosano]

Mr Irwin, et al,

Continuation of A Discussion:  Counterintelligence - A Professional
Exchange of Views

I think, given the recent need in Iraq, that this is a most timely (if
not a bit after the fact) discussion on an important aspect of HUMINT
and CI.  The need for accurate and timely information to the combatant
commander is exceptionally grave.  And recent events in Iraq have
demonstrated the gravity of the topic.

Before I make specific comments to Mr Irwin's commentary, I would like
to start-off on a baseline of information.  The first is the General
Army Mission (Congressional Intent) - as it relates to the concept of CI
Support:

     10 USC 3062 .  -  Policy; composition; organized peace establishment

     (a)  It is the intent of Congress to provide an Army that is
     capable, in conjunction with the other armed forces, of -

     (1) preserving the peace and security, and providing for the
     defense, of the United States, the Territories, Commonwealths, and
     possessions, and any areas occupied by the United States;


As this relates to Army Counterintelligence, it is important to know how
Congress defines it:

     50 USC 401a.  -  Definitions

     (3) The term ''counterintelligence'' means information gathered, and
     activities conducted, to protect against espionage, other
     intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted by or
     on behalf of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign
     organizations, or foreign persons, or international terrorist
     activities.


As these two items relate to, first the Army - then CI, it is important
to know what DOD Policy is on CI:

     DODD 5240.2 DoD Counterintelligence, June 6, 1983, USD (P)
     Paragraph D1. POLICY

     It is DoD policy that CI activities shall be:

     Undertaken to detect, identify, assess, and counter or neutralize
     the intelligence collection efforts, other intelligence activities,
     sabotage, terrorist activities, and assassination efforts of foreign
     powers, organizations, or persons directed against the Department of
     Defense, its personnel, information, material, and activities.


It is important to note and understand how these concepts piece together
in order to understand what is absent in the Army ad hoc program.

     Irwin, Robert wrote:

     My purpose was not to hold out the U.S. Army's basic course to that
     of say the CIA.  The two organizations have different missions and
     serve different purposes.  The purpose of HUMINT and CI is to act as
     the Army's Tactical Intelligence gathering and Counterintelligence
     apparatus, not to run deep cover operations in denied areas nor
     penetrate top echelons of foreign governments or anything else of
     the nature.


(COMMENT)

Clearly, I have to agree, this is the view held by the Army Intelligence
School and the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC).  But in holding
that view, they put the Combatant Commanders and their soldiers at
risk.  The Intelligence Community has long held that DOD and the Army
needs to take greater responsibility for their strategic needs in
planning and conducting operations.  Speaking DIRECTLY to this need is
Larry C. Kindsvater, the Executive Director for Intelligence Community
Affairs.

     A Senior Officer's Perspective

     The Need to Reorganize the Intelligence Community

     With the lack of intelligence investment, the military, for the most
     part, stopped making any distinction between national and
     tactical/operational intelligence capabilities. Today, the Joint
     Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the Combatant Commanders, and the services
     essentially presume that the DCI will provide the tactical
     intelligence they need to conduct military operations.  This
     reliance on national systems threatens not only military operational
     capabilities, but also our overall strategic national security posture.

     http://www.cia.gov/csi/studies/vol47no1/article03.html


The phrase needing the greatest emphasis is:  "This reliance on national
systems threatens not only military operational capabilities, but also
our overall strategic national security posture."

There has been a long standing, very persistent whining from the
military intelligence community in general, and within Army
Intelligence, specifically, that the current laws and directives
preclude Army CI activities from pursuing more aggressive operations.
This is nothing more than the traditional Military Intelligence (MI)
Officers avoiding the complexities of accepting such a challenge.  As an
example:

     10 USC 431.  -  Authority to engage in commercial activities as
     security for intelligence collection activities

     (a) Authority. -  The Secretary of Defense, subject to the
     provisions of this subchapter, may authorize the conduct of those
     commercial activities necessary to provide security for authorized
     intelligence collection activities abroad undertaken by the
     Department of Defense.


This is one of many types of operations that are authorized by law, yet
ignored by the Schoolhouse and TRADOC when it comes to the proper
Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB).  It was noticeably
absent for decades:

     "WASHINGTON (CNN) July 9, 1996 Web posted at: 3:40 p.m. EDT-- U.S.
     military commanders underestimated the terrorist threat in Saudi
     Arabia and were slow to improve security measures at a military
     apartment complex before last month's fatal bombing, Defense
     Secretary William Perry said Tuesday in Senate testimony. He also
     said the United States should take the offensive against terrorists."


And again:

     DoD USS COLE COMMISSION REPORT 9 January 2001 Executive Summary
     "Intelligence priorities and resources have shifted from Cold War
     focus to new and emerging threats only at the margins. We, like
     other commissions before us, recommend the reprioritization of
     resources for collection and analysis, including human intelligence
     and signal intelligence, against the terrorist. Intelligence
     production must be refocused and tailored to overwatch transiting
     units to mitigate the terrorist threat. Furthermore, an increase in
     counterintelligence (CI) resources dedicated to combating terrorism
     and development of clearer CI assessment standards is required."


The Army did not listen when the IC made note of the need to change, the
Army did not make changes as a result of the Khobar Towers event and the
Army did not change after the USS Cole event.  In fact, there is still
no C3I for Army CI.  This is known as mission avoidance.

     Irwin, Robert wrote:

     HUMINT helps to identify what the enemy's intentions are.  This is
     an invaluable real time tool for the battlefield commander and the
     purpose of HUMINT and CI in the U.S. Army.


(COMMENT)

While in theory this is true, in practice, it is untrue.  The Army has
no HUMINT Program.  It has Interrogators of Prisoners of War (IPW)
personnel that are called HUMINT.  Similarly, there is no such thing as
The Army CI Command or an Army CI Operations Center.  It is a segmented
operation.

It is important to realize that each day that Fort Huachuca dogmatically
sticks to its failed concepts of operations, the greater the Kindsvater
observation becomes apparent.  One needs only look at the events, as
they unfold, in Iraq.

CI had very clear windows of opportunities to establish conduits into
the Iraqi Community, but in its mission avoidant fashion, they did not
open up 431s for defensive source acquisition purposes (HUMINT and CI
collection), they did not conduct an immediate census (RFID Cards with
GIS interface), and they did not bother to establish internal trade
missions and small business grant administration.  These are all
off-the-shelf programs.

To defeat terrorists will require our human intelligence and
counterintelligence organizations to engage in clever, risky,
exceptional intelligence operations that may enable us to see inside the
terrorists cabal, to know in advance what their plans and intentions
might be and to act to interdict or to preclude the terrorists from
acting, Hughes said. The three-star general (former Director of the
Defense Intelligence Agency - DIA) said the new task of defeating
terrorists will not be easy and many within the U.S. Intelligence,
security and law enforcement communities are working hard on the
problem. ØI was one of them," he said. ØWe had the intent to succeed but
we did not succeed. Why? We did not have the collective will to do the
right thing. That sort of failure can no longer be tolerated.

Does Huachuca, TRADOC and Army Intelligence "have the collective will to
do the right thing?"  I question that.  Does Army Intelligence have the
leadership necessary to help the Army  "preserving the peace and
security, and providing for the defense, of the United States, the
Territories, Commonwealths, and possessions, and any areas occupied by
the United States?"  I question that?

The answers are in actual performance.  Ask the next CI Agent you see:
When did you last spot, assess, recruit and task a source for a mission
to detect, identify and exploit or nuetralized a hostile espionage or
terrorist threat?

Or, you can turn-on the TV and listen.  When the SECDEF said, "I
certainly would not have estimated that we would have had the number of
individuals lost that we have had lost in the last week" - he was
expressing a measure of competence either in HIS abilities, or the
abilities of the HUMINT and CI effort in Iraq. Since it cannot be the
case that the SECDEF is incompetent, that leaves us with only the
alternative: that the HUMINT and CI effort failed to adequately advise
him to the nature of the situation.

Very Respectfully,
Rocco Rosano

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